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Just Deserts: An Experimental Study
of Distributive Justice Norms
John T. Scott University of California, Davis
Richard E. Matland University of Houston
Philip A. Michelbach University of California, San Diego
Brian H. Bornstein University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract: We present a theoretically Informed experimental study
of distributive justice norms concerning income distribution. Our
study consists of three related experiments that examine how individuals use four distinct allocation
principles derived from both normative and empirical research—
equality, merit, need, and efficiency—under a condition of impartiality. Our experiments are designed
to investigate these principles and
to determine how independent factors influence how individuals use
them. We find that individuals tend
to use all or most of these principles simultaneously in making distributive justice judgments, but that
they weigh them differently according to various factors. In particular,
we find an expectedly strong difference between how women and
men use and weigh these principles.
This gender difference parallels—
and may even underlie—the gender
gap observed in political and policy
preferences.

U

nderstanding distributive justice norms is important for both normative and empirical research across political science and other disciplines. “What is justice?” has been a central question in political and moral theory for over two millennia. “Is it just?” is a question politicians, policy makers, and citizens face in deciding how to distribute benefits and burdens in society. Finally, the question “What do people believe is just?” interests researchers who study political behavior and attitudes. The legitimacy of the state and its leaders depends in large measure
on their perceived justice (Weatherford 1992; Alwin, Gornev, and Khakhulina 1995), and legislation and public policy are judged in terms of their
procedural and distributive justice (Rasinski 1987; Tyler et al. 1997).
Despite the importance of understanding distributive justice across all
areas of social inquiry, a gap remains between normative and empirical approaches. Normative researchers tend to view empirical findings as irrelevant for their work. In response, Elster (1995) suggests that philosophical theories contradicted by experimental and other evidence are open to question.
For their part, empirical researchers often focus on instrumental theories and
downplay normative considerations. Justice research nonetheless shows that
while self-interest is undoubtedly a factor in behavior, normative beliefs also
matter (Tyler et al. 1997). Miller articulates the relevance of theoretically informed experimental research into distributive justice norms: the social scientist “needs a normative theory both to enable him to distinguish beliefs and
pieces of behavior that express justice from those that do not, and to explain
such beliefs and behavior adequately” (1999,59).
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Most research into distributive justice norms in political science has been done through public opinion surveys or interviews. This research often seems to show
that individuals have conflicting views concerning justice (Lane 1962; Hochshild 1981; McClosky and Zaller
1984; Verba and Orren 1985; Kluegel and Smith 1986;
Verba et al. 1987; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995).
Reviewing the experimental and theoretical literature,
Miller argues (1991, 377), however, that people may
have complex rather than conflicting views on justice
(see Hochshild 1981). Experimental research reveals
that distributive justice judgments usually involve several distinct allocation principles. This research further
shows that several factors influence how individuals use
these principles, including what good is being distributed, the context of the distribution, and the individuals’
particular characteristics, such as gender, culture, ideology, and socio-economic status. (For overviews, see Miller 1999; Törnblom 1992; Elster 1995; Tyler et al. 1997;
Hegtvedt and Cook 1999).
We offer a theoretically informed experimental study
of distributive justice norms concerning income distribution that examines both allocation principles themselves
and the factors that affect how individuals use them.
We investigate four allocation principles derived from
both normative and empirical research-equality, merit,
need, and efficiency-and examine how they are related
to one another. We test how individuals use these allocation principles under the condition of impartiality, following a long tradition linking justice and impartiality
(see Rawls 1971, Barry 1995). Our study builds on two
recent studies of judgments of income distribution, the
first by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and the second by Mitchell et al. (1993). Both studies show that individuals consider multiple principles and make tradeoffs among them, but they conflict as to which principles are involved. One of our aims is to make sense of
these apparently contradictory results. Second, we examine how independent factors such as gender and ideology affect how individuals use these principles. In order to do so, we create more precise measures of participants’ use of these principles and use a much larger sample size than previous studies.
We begin by discussing the four major allocation
principles found in the normative research on distributive justice. Second, we review the relevant experimental research. Third, we present our own experimental design and theoretical predictions. Fourth, we present our
results. Finally, we discuss our results concerning the allocation principles and the factors that influence how individuals use them. We take special note of an unexpect-
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ed gender difference in how women and men apply allocation principles and conclude by speaking to the relevance of our results for justice research and other areas
of political science.
Allocation Principles in Normative Theory
From Aristotle to Rawls, philosophers have formulated different theories of distributive justice. The apparent
disagreement over what is “just” or “fair” within philosophy nonetheless obscures a more important consensus
over a small number of distinct allocation principles. We
have identified four analytically distinct allocation principles in our review of the normative and empirical literature: equality, merit, need, and efficiency. Different theories of distributive justice can be categorized by which
allocation principles they emphasize and how they conceptualize the relationship among them. For example,
Rawls (1971) takes a “constructivist” approach that offers a theory of how individuals would lexically order
these principles under a condition of “fairness” or impartiality. Other theorists adopt a pluralist approach that
builds on an intuition that individuals use these principles simultaneously and make tradeoffs among them
(Miller 1999) or that they weigh them differently in different “spheres” (Walzer 1983). Our aim is to draw on
the normative literature to define these principles for
systematic study.
Equality
The close relationship between equality and justice has
been recognized since the beginnings of political philosophy. Aristotle indicates this kinship when he takes
advantage of the fact that the same Greek word (isos)
means both “fair” and “equal.” “And so if what is unjust
is unfair, what is just is fair [or: equal], as seems true
to everyone even without argument” (1985, 123). While
Aristotle emphasizes proportional equality between merit and reward, modern justice theories tend to disassociate equality and merit by conceiving of equality in an
absolute sense. The norm of equality has been progressively expanded from arguments for equality of rights to
equality of conditions (Dahl 1989). Equality remains the
presumptive principle in nearly all modern theories of
justice, as well as a central norm in debates over democracy, the social welfare state, and the distribution of income and other goods (Weale 1985). considerable disagreements over just what equality means remain (see
Rae 1981, Sen 1992, ix, 12–16), but we will operationalize the principle as absolute equality of outcome.
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Merit
Despite the centrality of equality, most justice theories acknowledge other allocation principles that are potentially in tension with equality, notably merit. Merit requires that goods be distributed in proportion to contribution where that contribution is due to qualities or activities thought to “deserve” reward. Since contribution
is usually unequal, merit is most often a justification for
inequality. The idea of merit as proportionate equality
has its roots in Aristotle’s theory of proportional equality, or “equity.” Merit claims have been questioned recently, most notably by Rawls, who argues that income
outcomes based on effort and ability should be considered “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (1971, 15).
Critics of Rawls and others nonetheless continue to argue that merit is a legitimate allocation principle (e.g.,
Sandel 1982; Sher 1987; Miller 1999). Moreover, empirical research shows people clearly do consider merit in making allocation judgments (Miller 1999, 63–73).
Miller argues (1999, 66) the aspects of contribution that
can be considered as “deserving” reward can be reduced
to ability, effort, and performance. Since effort and ability are the normatively relevant determinants of performance, we consider merit in terms of effort and ability.
Need
If merit justifies departing from an equal distribution,
need is often invoked as a principle to limit inequalities. For example, Boulding (1962) argues there is a tension between “desert” and a “social minimum.” Need is
closely related to equality, and equal need can be a criterion for equal distribution. A number of theories nonetheless treat need as a distinct allocation principle (see
Miller 1999, 203–230). A similar tension might exist
between need and efficiency, which justifies inequality based on the aggregate benefits. For example, Locke
suggests that need places a limit on the inequality stemming from the exercise of property rights ([1689] 1988,
292–293). The principle of need as a “social minimum”
has strongly influenced contemporary social democratic
thought and social welfare programs in the United States
and elsewhere (Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990).
The concepts of need and relative deprivation have
been developed in welfare economics as important elements in the analysis of income distribution (especially Sen 1992, 1997)) but there has been little systematic development of need as a normative principle (Braybrooke 1987). This lack of theoretical development may
be due in part to the strong conceptual relationship between need and equality, especially when need is con-
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ceived of as relative rather than absolute. Since one of
the aims of our experiment is to test the distinctness of
need and equality, we consider need in absolute terms as
a minimum level of necessary social goods.
Efficiency
Efficiency is another allocation principle used to justify
inequalities in terms of aggregate benefit (Locke [1688]
1988; Schumpeter 1947; Friedman 1963). While not
strictly speaking a normative principle in itself, efficiency
is used to justify the fairness of inequalities and therefore
raises a normative consideration in allocation judgments.
There is a tension between claims for economic efficiency and the strong claim to equality. Rawls terms (1971,
36, 44) this tradeoff the “aggregative-distributive dichotomy,” while Okun (1975) makes it the centerpiece of his
work. Many theorists reject merit as a legitimate justification of inequality, but defend inequalities as legitimate
when based upon efficiency (Nozick 1974; Okun 1975;
Hayek 1976). We use the term “efficiency” to mean that
a greater amount of overall goods for the same amount of
input is preferred (see Sen 1992, especially 6–8)) or what
is sometimes termed “wealth maximization” (Plattner
1979, 43–44; Posner 1981). (“Efficiency” as we operationalize it does not meet the Pareto optimality condition,
but it is consistent with the Kaldor-Hicks principle.) Our
research is designed to explore the relationship between
efficiency and the other allocation principles.
Experimental Research on
Distributive Justice
The allocation principles we identify in the normative
literature are also central to experimental research on
distributive justice. Experimental research over the past
fifty years, principally in psychology, has been characterized by a shift to a pluralist framework based on findings that individuals use several allocation principles
in distributive justice judgments. Early research concentrated on equity theory, which conceived distributive justice in terms of the proportion of inputs and outputs from an interaction (e.g., Adams 1965; Messick and
Cook 1983). The pluralist approach was inspired largely by Deutsch, who argues (1975, 1985) that equity research conflates distinct allocation principles. Most subsequent research has settled upon a limited number of allocation principles, although terminological inconsistency and theoretical incompleteness continues to impede
both progress and communication. Deutsch (1975) identifies three distinct principles: equity, equality, and need.
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What he means by “equity” is the desire for higher aggregate outputs, or “efficiency” in our terminology. Similarly, Schwinger (1980) studies contribution, equality,
and need, but by “contribution” he means deserts proportional to contribution, or “merit” in our usage. A similar pluralist approach can be seen in other empirical research into distributive justice. For instance, the study of
public opinion on justice issues conducted by the International Social Justice Program in twelve countries finds
principles roughly similar to those we have discussed
through factor analysis of survey responses (Swift et al.
1995). Finally, Sen (1997, 15–18, 77, 91) utilizes these
same principles in his research on welfare economics.
Our review of the normative and empirical research is
intended to be a step toward a more comprehensive theoretical basis for empirical study.
Theoretical incompleteness may also explain the apparently inconsistent results found in two recent experimental studies that are particularly relevant for our own
work. In the first study, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992)
present an empirical test of Rawls’ theory of justice by
having participants in groups determine rules for distributing income they are to earn by doing an unspecified task
(behind a “veil of ignorance”). Their results show a striking consistency through different iterations and in different settings, including cross-nationally (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992, especially 60). Of the four alternative
models among which groups choose, they find that groups
almost never choose a Rawlsian solution (1 percent), and
relatively seldom do they choose either maximizing average income (12 percent) or maximizing efficiency with
an inequality (“range”) constraint (9 percent). Instead,
groups overwhelmingly choose maximizing income after
setting a minimum (“floor”) income (78 percent). They
argue their results reveal that efficiency and need (in our
terminology) are the chief principles used in adopting fair
income distributions. Their results are nonetheless open
to different interpretations. The consistent adoption of a
floor constraint may offer evidence that need is a distinct
principle, but it might also be interpreted as evidence for
a concern with inequality. While relatively few groups explicitly chose a range constraint, many chose a minimum
income level that effectively narrowed the income range,
especially since the minimum levels they adopted were in
several cases well above real-world income levels (1992,
82–94; cf. Lissowski and Swistak 1995). Likewise, while
their finding that most groups maximized income may indicate a concern with efficiency, since they did not distinguish between efficiency and merit in their design they
cannot determine why groups allowed inequality when
maximizing income.
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The second study by Mitchell et al. (1993) produces results that seem to contradict Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s. They also examine behavior under a condition
of impartiality, but rather than attempting to place individuals behind a “veil of ignorance,” they tell participants to assume they are being asked their opinion about
policy options as advisors to a hypothetical society.
They then have participants rank these policy options in
the form of income distributions that pose tradeoffs between equality and efficiency. Their major experimental
manipulation is to vary information given to participants
about the degree that merit explains income (10 percent,
50 percent, or 90 percent), as opposed to luck, connections, and similar factors. Their results demonstrate that
participants employ both equality and efficiency and
make tradeoffs between them. Their results further suggest that equality-efficiency preferences are mediated by
assumptions about merit, with participants showing an
increased preference for efficiency and a decreased preference for equality as the degree of assumed merit increases. They claim that the result of the merit manipulation supports Rawls, since participants tend to prefer equality over efficiency when luck and other “morally arbitrary” factors overwhelmingly determine income.
This result may confirm that individuals act in a manner
consistent with Rawls’ expectations when they believe
that unequal income is not in itself merited, but their results otherwise contradict Rawls since considerations of
merit clearly affected participants’ relative preference for
equality in conditions where merit increasingly predicts
income. Likewise, their claim that a significant number
of participants have behavior consistent with a Rawlsian maximin model is questionable because their a priori model specification does not effectively distinguish
egalitarian and Rawlsian solutions: if they had used relative equality as their measure for equality (i.e., the proportion between the highest and lowest quartiles) rather than the absolute measure they did employ (i.e., the
absolute dollar difference between the highest and lowest quartiles), then the rank ordering for the egalitarian
model would be exactly the same as the Rawlsian model. Although the measurement of inequality is a complex
and often highly technical subject (see Temkin 1993;
Sen 1997), all major measures are proportional rather
than absolute, and therefore we use a proportional measure in our own experiments. Finally, it is unclear from
Mitchell et al.’s results whether need operates as a distinct allocation principle since they did not systematically vary need independent of equality. Subsequent work
by two of the authors of their study points out this flaw
and suggests that participants are in fact influenced by
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need (Ordóñez and Mellers 1993). We vary need independent of equality.
Our own research is intended in part to test the
seemingly conflicting results of these two sets of experiments. To summarize: whereas Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) find virtually no support for either Rawlsian or egalitarian norms, and instead find that participants overwhelmingly maximize efficiency after setting
a minimum level of need, Mitchell et al. (1993) argue
their results show strong Rawlsian and egalitarian norms
at work as well as a concern for efficiency. Some of the
differences in the findings of these experiments are undoubtedly due to differences in experimental manipulation. We further suggest that they are the result of an incomplete experimental design that prevents either set of
studies from analyzing all four allocation principles simultaneously. Our experimental design builds on that of
Mitchell et al., but with significant changes based on our
review of the normative and experimental research.
E X P E R I M E N TA L D E S I G N A N D
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
Experimental Design
All three experiments in our study employ the same basic design. Participants read a short description of a hypothetical society and are asked to imagine they are
outside observers giving their advice to the society.
To insure impartiality, they are explicitly told they are
not members of this society. They are asked to evaluate nine policy alternatives being considered by this society based on the effects each would have on the level and distribution of income (see appendix for participant instructions). These policies are not described, but
are presented in terms of their effect on income. After
reading the country description, participants are given a
short test to confirm that the experimental manipulations
were successful.1 We then present participants with a set
of nine income distributions in randomized fashion. For
each distribution a bar graph shows the average income
for each quintile and information on the overall average
income, the ratio of the incomes of the top and bottom
quintiles (the “income inequality ratio”), and the poverty line. Participants evaluate each distribution on a scale
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from 0 (“very bad”) to 10 (“very good”). The answers
to these questions are used to create the dependent variables for statistical analyses. Finally, participants complete a post-experimental questionnaire that provides the
basis for the control variables.
Experimental Manipulations and
Dependent Variables
Within each experiment, we present all participants with
the same set of nine income distributions. These nine alternatives result from the manipulation of two withinsubject variables, each with three levels: efficiency (low,
medium, high) and equality (high, medium, low). Efficiency is operationalized as average income and equality as the ratio of the income of the highest quintile to
the lowest. Table 1 shows the general design used for all
three experiments along with the income distributions
used in Experiments 1 and 2. In all three experiments
we vary efficiency in three levels by increasing average
income constantly from one level to the next: $32,000,
$42,000, $55,000.2 We also vary equality across three
levels in all the experiments. Varying equality and efficiency in this way poses participants with a number of
equality-efficiency tradeoffs that we can use to determine their relative preferences for the two principles. In
Experiments 1 and 2, participants face four equality-efficiency tradeoffs, represented by the arrows along the diagonals in Table 1. For example, there is a tradeoff between the high equality/medium efficiency distribution
and the medium equality/high efficiency one. Each tradeoff enables us to examine whether participants prefer
greater income at the cost of lower equality or whether
they prefer greater equality at the cost of lower income.
We study the relationship between equality-efficiency preferences and the other two allocation principles,
merit and need, through two variables manipulated between participants. The first variable is designed to examine how equality and efficiency preferences are affected by assumptions about merit. As in Mitchell et
al. (1993), we randomly vary what participants are told
about the degree to which income is explained by effort
and ability (10 percent, 50 percent, and 90 percent) as
opposed to luck, connections, and similar factors. The
second variable is designed to test whether need is a

1

Participants who do not answer all these questions correctly or do not
complete the experiment are not included in the final data set. In order to
insure that they have been successfully manipulated by the between-subject merit and need variables, the manipulation check includes questions
on the degree to which income is determined by effort and ability and the
level of the poverty line. It also contains questions to make sure that participants can distinguish between more efficient and more equal income
distributions.

2 When creating the income distributions we consulted U.S. Census Bureau data in order to make the distributions plausible. In all of our
experiments the middle efficiency level is $42,000 for the average income of a four-person family (our stipulated measure). The median income (averaged for the two testing sites) for a four-person family for fiscal year 1998 was $42,709. See http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/
4person.html .
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distinct allocation principle. We do so by manipulating
what participants are told about the poverty line. In Experiments 1 and 3, the poverty line is either $10,000 or
$15,000.3 The poverty line manipulation affects the low
equality distributions, or the bottom, shaded row in Table 1. When the poverty line is stipulated as $10,000, all
of the income quintiles in the three low equality income
distributions are above the poverty line, but when the
poverty line is stipulated as $15,000, the lowest income
quintile in the three low equality income distributions is
below the poverty line.
We have developed two dependent variables to observe the relationships among the different allocation
principles. The first dependent variable is an equalityefficiency tradeoff score created by summing the differences between a participant’s ratings of the two distributions in each of the four diagonal tradeoffs indicated by
the arrows in Table 1 (e.g., high equality/low efficiency
-medium equality/medium efficiency). Preferences for
3 We consulted U.S. Census Bureau data when designing the poverty manipulation, although we were constrained in setting our poverty line
by its effect on the income distributions we adopted. The federally stipulated poverty line for a four-person family was $16,400 in 1997. See
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld97.html.
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equality result in positive scores, while preferences for
efficiency produce negative scores. The second dependent variable is a need sensitivity score created by taking the sum of a participant’s ratings of the three distributions affected by the poverty manipulation, i.e., the
three low equality distributions in the bottom, shaded
row in Table 1.
Participants were undergraduates at the University
of Houston and Louisiana State University, all of whom
were tested in Fall 1998. Participants from the University of Houston were tested in lower-level political science
courses, while participants from Louisiana State University were recruited in lower-level psychology courses and tested in small groups in a laboratory setting. No
statistically significant differences exist between the two
sites or among testing groups, so we combine the data
for all analyses.
Theoretical Predictions
Equality-efficiency preferences. Our manipulation of
equality and efficiency levels in the income distributions
is designed examine participants use and efficiency as
allocation principles, especially in relation to one anoth-
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er. By varying equality and efficiency levels, we can test
whether efficiency and equality are “normal goods,” in
the economic sense of more being preferred to less. If
equality functions as a normal good, then participants’
ratings of more equal income distributions will be higher
than less equal distributions within each efficiency level.
Likewise, if efficiency is a normal good, then they will
prefer more efficient distributions to less efficient ones
within each equality level. If, as we expect, most participants use both equality and efficiency as allocation principles, then the interesting question becomes how they
make tradeoffs between them.
We begin our analysis of participants’ equality-efficiency tradeoffs by categorizing individual-level behavior in accordance with three alternative theoretical models: (1) strict egalitarian; (2) strict efficiency-maximization; (3) mixed. Strict egalitarians always prefer the
more equal distribution to the less equal one in each of
the four diagonal equality-efficiency tradeoffs indicated
by the arrows in Table 1. In contrast, strict efficiencymaximizers always prefer the more efficient distribution
to the less efficient one in the same four tradeoffs. Finally, participants who view both equality and efficiency as
normal goods will make tradeoffs between them, sometimes preferring more efficient distributions and sometimes more equal distributions, depending upon their relative preferences for the two principles. We expect most
participants to use both equality and efficiency as allocation principles, viewing both equality and efficiency
as normal goods and therefore making tradeoffs between
them. We also expect they will use these two principles
to different degrees, with some participants more concerned with equality and others with efficiency. These
results would be consistent with Mitchell et al.’s (1993)
findings, but generally contrary to Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s (1992) results.
While inspection of the raw data and comparison of
participants’ behavior to these theoretical models provide us with considerable information, we will analyze
equality-efficiency preferences more closely by using
the equality-efficiency tradeoff score as the dependent
variable in multivariate analyses. This variable allows us
to examine the interaction of equality-efficiency preferences with the independent merit and need variables in
the presence of the control variables.
Merit effects. The merit manipulation is designed to
test whether equality and efficiency preferences are mediated by assumptions about the degree to which income
is explained by effort and ability, or “merited.” We randomly divide the sample for each experiment into three
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groups that are given different information about the degree to which income is merited: 10 percent, 50 percent,
and 90 percent. The merit factor identifies which group a
participant falls into (10, 50, 90). We predict that participants will be less concerned with equality as the degree
to which income is merited increases. The merit factor
should therefore have a negative effect on the equalityefficiency tradeoff variable. This result would be consistent with Mitchell et al. (1993). We further expect that
merit should have a negative effect on the need sensitivity variable since participants will view those below
the poverty line as increasingly “deservedly” poor. This
finding would be consistent with the tradeoff Ordóñez
and Mellers (1993) find between need and merit.
Need effects. The poverty-line manipulation is designed
to determine whether need is a distinct allocation principle. As noted above, the design used by Mitchell et al.
(1993) makes it impossible to determine whether a preference for more egalitarian distributions is due to a concern with equality or need. Our poverty-line manipulation enables us to distinguish the two principles. We
randomly divide our sample into two groups with different poverty lines: $10,000 (where no distributions are
affected) and $15,000 (where the low equality distributions are affected). The poverty dummy variable identifies which group a participant falls into (0 if the participant is in the $10,000 group and 1 in the $15,000
group). We expect that participants will give lower ratings to distributions affected by the poverty manipulation across merit conditions, with the poverty variable
therefore having a negative effect on the need sensitivity
variable. The distinctness of need as an allocation principle would be consistent with several studies, including
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992; see also Alves and
Rossi 1978; Mellers 1982; Ordóñez and Mellers 1993).
We also expect the poverty line to have a weak effect on
the equality-efficiency tradeoff variable since a concern
with need should affect two of the four equations that
comprise the variable.
Control variable effects. Our post-experimental questionnaire elicits information on demographic and political values that provide measures for the control variables that other studies have suggested affect how individuals use allocation principles in making distributive
justice judgments. A number of studies show differences
in the justice beliefs of men and women. Women generally tend to prefer equality, while men tend to weigh efficiency more heavily (Major and Deaux 1982; Major and
Adams 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986, chapter 5). In ad-
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dition, women have been found to be more sensitive to
poverty and need (Kluegel and Miyano 1995; Davidson,
Steinmann, and Wegener 1995). We therefore predict
that gender will have a negative effect on the equalityefficiency tradeoff and need sensitivity variables.
Political ideology has also been found to affect
distributive justice judgments, with liberals on average being more concerned with equality and conservatives with efficiency (Tetlock and Mitchell 1993; Mitchell et al. 1993). Similarly, conservatives are less concerned with need than liberals, especially as merit level increases (see Skitka and Tetlock 1992, 1993; Tetlock
and Mitchell 1993). We therefore expect that ideology
(based on a five-point scale from conservative to liberal) will have a positive effect on the equality-efficiency
tradeoff variable and a negative effect on the need sensitivity variable.
While most studies suggest that lower SES individuals in the United States generally endorse disparity in
income based on beliefs in merit (Lane 1962, chapter 5;
Hochshild 1981), a negative correlation has been found
between SES and egalitarian beliefs (Lane 1962, chapter
7; Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995), and a positive correlation has been found between high SES and
merit beliefs (McClosky and Zaller 1984; Kluegel and
Smith 1986). No experimental research has been done to
test these findings.
Finally, we include a question designed to test the
power of our experimental manipulation of merit. It is
possible that the degree to which participants see income as being deserved is not a function of the experimental manipulation of merit level in a hypothetical society, but rather their perceptions of our own society. To
test for this possibility, we ask participants for their own
perception of the degree to which income is merited in
the United States (0–100 percent). If this independent
merit perception variable is not significant in our analyses, then we can be confident that our results concerning
the effect of merit on equality-efficiency preferences are
due to our experimental manipulation and not to individuals’ independent perceptions.
Results
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, the income distributions rated by participants were created by manipulating efficiency and
equality independently. We increase, efficiency constantly across three levels ($32,000, $42,000, $55,000) and
increase income inequality constantly across three levels

OF

P OLITICAL S CIENCE 45 (2001)

(2.0, 3.5, 6.1). The income distributions used in Experiment 1 are shown in Table 1 above. Table 2 reports the
mean ratings for the income distributions for the three
merit conditions and separated by the two poverty conditions. There are 401 participants in Experiment 1 (242
women and 159 men).
Our expectation that participants would generally treat both equality and efficiency as normal goods is
confirmed by the mean ratings in Table 2. In every single
case across all conditions participants on average prefer
more equal to less equal distributions when efficiency is
held constant and more efficient to less efficient distributions when equality is held constant.
More interestingly, individual-level analysis of the
ratings shows that participants are divided in their use of
equality and efficiency. Their differing use of principles
can be seen by comparing participants’ observed behavior
to the theoretical models outlined above. The strict egalitarian model fits the observed behavior of 26.2 percent
of participants, while the strict efficiency model fits the
behavior of 7.7 percent of participants. Only one-third of
participants are therefore strongly oriented toward either
equality or efficiency, while the other two-thirds fit the
mixed model, using both equality and efficiency as allocation principles and making tradeoffs between them.
Experiment 1 initially seems to confirm that participants’ equality-efficiency preferences are mediated by
their merit assumptions. First, simply using visual inspection of the mean ratings and focusing on the diagonal tradeoffs, as Mitchell et al. (1993) do, we see an apparent shift in preferences in the aggregate results. The
direction of the absolute preferences in the four diagonal
tradeoffs are shown by arrows superimposed over the
mean ratings in Table 2, with arrows pointing in a single
direction indicating a statistically significant difference
(two-tailed test; p < .05). Inspection reveals that equality-efficiency preferences change in the direction of preferring more efficiency as merit increases. When merit
is set at 10 percent, seven of the eight tradeoffs show
a clear preference for more equality, while when merit is set at 90 percent there is an even split with participants on average preferring greater efficiency in four of
the tradeoffs and greater equality in the other four. These
results are consistent with Mitchell et al. (1993), but we
have developed more precise measures to explore these
apparent preference changes more fully.
We analyze equality-efficiency preferences using
the equality-efficiency tradeoff score described above.
Equality-efficiency tradeoff scores ranged from +24 (out
of a possible +30), for the participant with the most extreme preference for equality, to –28 (out of a possible
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–30), for the participant with the most extreme preference for efficiency (x = +3.4, sd = 8.8). The two independent variables of greatest interest are merit level and
poverty level. Political ideology, mother’s education
(our measure of SES),4 sex, and the participant’s independent merit perception are used as control variables5
Table 3a presents the results of regressing these factors
on the equality-efficiency tradeoff score.
The aggregate results reported in Table 3a (column
1) show merit level has a strong effect on equality preferences in the expected direction. As the degree to which
income is explained by effort and ability increases, participants clearly become less concerned with equality.
The poverty variable does not appear to have an effect,
but we will examine the poverty line manipulation momentarily. As for the control variables, sex has a large effect. Women show a much stronger preference for equality than men. Furthermore, SES has an effect, with participants from higher-SES families tending to emphasize
efficiency. Finally, that independent merit perception is
not statistically significant suggests that participants’ behavior is explained by our experimental manipulation of
merit rather than their own preconceptions.6
4 We tested four different measures of SES: mother’s education, father’s education, family income, and a factor created using all three elements. All four measures provide consistent effects. We chose mother’s
education as the control variable because we have more complete data on
this variable.
5 We

ran regression models for all analyses that included measures
for party identification, race, and age. None of these other variables had
any statistically significant effect or had any substantial influence on the
statistically significant variables, and so we report only results of the reduced regression equation.
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The gender difference we found on the aggregate
level is particularly striking, and we therefore divided
the sample into women and men and reran the regressions on these separate samples. Table 3a (columns 2
and 3) shows the results for women and men. We find
that a surprisingly large difference in the way men and
women respond to the experimental stimuli underlies the
aggregate results. First, the significant effect of the merit
manipulation seen in the aggregate results was driven by
women, who react strongly to the change in merit while
men do not. Second, while ideology does not have an effect on the aggregate level, dividing the sample reveals
a strong effect for men but no effect for women. Among
men, liberals tend to be more egalitarian while conservatives are more concerned with efficiency. As for SES,
men are somewhat more strongly affected by SES, with
higher-SES participants more concerned with efficiency.
The effect of SES for women is in the same direction as
for men, although the variable is not statistically significant. Finally, participants’ independent merit perception
is not significant for either women or men.
We analyze the distinctness of need by examining
the effect of poverty manipulation on participants’ ratings of the income distributions affected by the manipulation. We use the need sensitivity score as the depen6 Independent

merit perceptions in Experiment 1 varied from 5 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 61.7 (sd = 19.8). Results for Experiments 2 and 3 were very similar. For Experiment 2, they varied from
0 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 64.6 (sd = 17.5). For Experiment 3, they varied from 0 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 62.2
(sd= 20.7).
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dent variable and the same independent variables as in
the regression analyses of equality-efficiency preferences.7 The results of the analyses of need are reported
in Table 3b. The aggregate results (column 1) show the
poverty factor has an effect in the expected difference,
but it is not statistically significant. The only statistically significant variables are merit and sex. Women give
lower ratings to the low equality distributions than men
regardless of the poverty line. As with the previous analyses, we split the sample by gender and reran the analysis. When we look at the results for women alone (column 2), we see some support for the distinctness of need
from the marginal statistical significance of the poverty
manipulation. Women’s concern with need is also mediated by the merit manipulation, with women being less
7 In running regression diagnostics, we found heteroskedasticity
across the error terms of the standard OLS regression. We therefore report robust standard error estimators using the Huber-White correction.
We also ran the analyses using a negative binomial regression. Even
though the dependent variable is not, strictly speaking, an event count,
the shape of the underlying distribution conforms to a negative binomial.
The results in terms of the significance of the independent variables are
the same no matter which method we use (standard OLS, OLS with robust standard error estimators, or negative binomial regression).
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concerned about need as the degree to which merit explains income increases. In turn, men (column 3) do not
appear to use need as a distinct allocation principle, and
none of the variables tested predict men’s need sensitivity.
While we were surprised that the poverty manipulation did not have a stronger impact, we suspect that this
result may be due in part to a serious floor effect. Scores
for the low equality distributions were already so low on
average that the added poverty condition had only a limited effect. For example, where the poverty line was set
at $10,000,33 percent of participants gave the low equality/low efficiency distribution a rating of 0 and 21 percent gave it a rating of 1. We further believe that our design of the income distributions in Experiment 1 did not
sufficiently distinguish need from inequality since the
three income distributions affected by the poverty line
manipulation were also the lowest equality level distributions. We therefore believe that the concern for low
equality in those distributions masked any distinct sensitivity to need. In order to test this conjecture, we did a
follow-up experiment, Experiment 2.
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Experiment 2
For Experiment 2 we use the same design and distributions
as Experiment 1 (see Table l), but with the poverty line
stipulated as $20,000. In addition to the three distributions
in the low equality level, as in Experiment 1, raising the
poverty line to $20,000 affects the two distributions with
low and medium efficiency levels in the medium-equality row, placing the bottom quintile of these distributions
below the poverty line. Because the level of inequality of
these distributions is modest, we believe this to be a better test of the poverty line manipulation as it avoids confounding concern for inequality with sensitivity to need,
as we suspect occurred in Experiment 1. We expect that
the mean ratings for these two distributions will be significantly lower in the $20,000 poverty condition than in the
$10,000 and $15,000. Experiment 2 includes 136 participants (eighty-five women and fifty-one men).
To analyze the effect of the poverty manipulation
in Experiment 2, we use a modified need sensitivity index that creates a score for each participant by summing
the ratings of the two distributions in the medium equality level affected by the poverty manipulation. We then
use the modified need sensitivity score as the dependent
variable and control for the same variables as in the previous analyses, combining the $20,000 poverty condition cases of Experiment 2 (poverty variable coded 1)
and the $10,000 and $15,000 conditions from Experiment 1 (poverty variable coded 0).
The results for Experiment 2 using the modified
need sensitivity score show more support than Experiment 1 for the existence of need as a distinct allocation
principle. On the aggregate level the poverty factor is a
highly statistically significant predictor of participants’
need sensitivity (b = –1.03*** (.25)). As with Experiment 1, merit is a relatively strong predictor (b = .012**
(.005)), with participants less concerned with need as
merit level increased. When we separate the sample into
women and men, as in the previous analyses, we see
the same gender difference as in the previous experiment. For women, the poverty factor is strongly statistically significant (b = -1.48*** (.41)). The merit factor
is also a statistically significant predictor for women (b
= .015** (.006)), as is ideology (b = -.49** (.25)), with
liberals being somewhat more concerned with poverty
than conservatives. As for men, the poverty factor is not
statistically significant in predicting need sensitivity, nor
is any other variable.8
8 These results use a two-tailed test, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <
,001, with standard errors in parentheses. Regression diagnostics revealed no heteroskedasticity so we use OLS standard errors. Testing for
the effect of the $20,000 poverty line on the three low-equality distribu-
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In sum, Experiment 2 suggests need is a distinct allocation principle for at least some participants and that
women are considerably more sensitive to need than
men. It also seems to confirm our conjecture from the
results of Experiment 1, that need and equality are often
difficult to distinguish in practice although they are conceptually distinct. One of the purposes of Experiment 3
is to clearly distinguish need and equality to see whether
the principles function independently.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 is designed to explore equality-efficiency
preferences in greater detail, as well as to confirm the results of Experiments 1 and 2 under different conditions.
The equality-efficiency tradeoffs in Experiment 1 were
limited to the four diagonal cases between two constant
equality levels. Our analysis of individual-level behavior
in Experiment 1 likely overstated the number of efficiency-maximizers and egalitarians, and therefore underestimated the number of participants who use both principles. In Experiment 3 we create more tradeoff situations
to refine our analysis of participants’ use of equality and
efficiency as allocation principles. This change in design
will also alter the effect of the poverty manipulation on
the low equality income distributions, making the issue
of need more distinct than in the earlier experiments.
As in the previous experiments, we increase efficiency using the same three constant levels ($32,000,
$42,000, $55,000). While we use three equality levels as
the earlier experiments, rather than keeping equality constant we decrease equality from distribution to distribution across efficiency levels in approximately equal (absolute) steps within each equality level. This variation of
equality means that participants are posed with two horizontal equality-efficiency tradeoffs within each equality
level (e.g., high equality/medium efficiency versus high
equality/high efficiency), or six horizontal tradeoffs in
all, in addition to the four diagonal tradeoffs created in
the earlier experiments. Table 4 shows the income distributions used in Experiment 3. Experiment 3 included
460 participants (290 women and 170 men).
Individual-level analysis of participants’ behavior
confirms our conjecture that more participants than was
apparent in Experiment 1 use both equality and efficiency as allocation principles and make tradeoffs between
them. As noted above, the design of Experiment 3 permits
stricter theoretical models than Experiment 1, where we
tions, we found no significant effect when comparing the $10,000 poverty line sample from Experiment 1 and those at the $20,000 poverty line
in Experiment 2. These results heighten our suspicion that the failure of
the poverty manipulation in Experiment 1 was caused by a floor effect.
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could analyze only the diagonal tradeoffs between equality and efficiency. A strict egalitarian model further restricts the earlier egalitarian model by adding to the condition that a participant must prefer the more equal to the
less equal distribution in each of the four diagonal tradeoffs the further stipulation that a participant must have
an equal or great preference for the more equal to less
equal distribution in all of the horizontal tradeoffs. Only
9.7 percent of participants fit this model. A strict efficiency model further restricts the earlier efficiency model by
adding to the condition that a participant must prefer the
more efficient to the less efficient distribution in each of
the four diagonal tradeoffs the further stipulation that a
participant must have an equal or greater preference the
more efficient to less efficient distribution in all of the
horizontal tradeoffs. Only 6.3 percent of participants fit
this model. (Examining participants’ behavior using the
less strict models used to analyze Experiment 1 reveals
similar results as the earlier experiment: 36.4 percent of
participants have observed behavior fitting the egalitarian model and 8.2 percent fitting the efficiency-maximization model.) The vast majority of participants therefore
use both equality and efficiency as allocation principles
and make tradeoffs between them.
Visual inspection of the mean ratings for the income distributions for Experiment 3 across merit conditions and separated by poverty conditions (Table 5) reveals results generally similar to those in Experiment 1.
First, participants on average view both equality and ef-
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ficiency as normal goods. Second, there appears to be a
change in absolute and relative preferences for equality
and efficiency across merit conditions, with participants
on average being less concerned with equality as merit level increases. Once again, however, closer analysis of these results confirms the results from Experiment
1, including the underlying difference between the behavior of women and men. We examine these preferences using the same equality-efficiency tradeoff score and
regression equations as in Experiment 1. Equality-efficiency tradeoff scores ranged from +25, for the participant with the most extreme preference for equality, to –
22, for the participant with the most extreme preference
for efficiency (x = +5.4, sd = 10.0).
We see at the aggregate level (Table 6a, column 1)
that merit once again has a strong effect on equality-efficiency preferences in the expected direction, with participants less concerned with equality as merit level increases. Unlike Experiment 1, the poverty condition has
a strong effect on equality-efficiency preferences, suggesting an independent effect of the poverty manipulation. The effect of the control variables in Experiment
3 is broadly consistent with the earlier experiment. Sex
once again has a large effect, with women showing a
stronger preference for equality than men. Also important is ideology, with liberals somewhat more concerned
with equality than conservatives. SES did not have any
significant effect on equality-efficiency preferences. Finally, as in Experiment 1, participants’ independent mer-
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it perception is not a significant predictor, further confirming that their behavior is explained by our experimental manipulation.
The surprisingly strong difference in behavior of
women and men that we found in our analysis of equality-efficiency preferences in Experiment 1 is confirmed
in Experiment 3. As with the earlier experiment, we divided the sample into women and men and reran the regressions (Table 6a, columns 2 and 3). The strong effect of the merit manipulation on the aggregate level is
once again explained by the behavior of women alone,
with women being less concerned with equality as merit level increases. The poverty condition has an independent effect on women’s equality-efficiency preferences,
but none of the other variables do. As for men, as in Experiment 1, the merit manipulation had no significant effect on their equality-efficiency preferences. Ideology is
the only control variable that has a statistically significant effect, with liberal men more sensitive to need than
conservative ones. Unlike Experiment 1, however, the
poverty manipulation is weakly significant for men (p <
.08), suggesting the poverty manipulation has an effect
in Experiment 3 for both women and men.
Our expectation that need is a distinct allocation
principle is affirmed in Experiment 3. To analyze the effect of the poverty manipulation, we use the same need
sensitivity score and regression equations as in Experiment 1. First, on the aggregate level (Table 6b, column 1) we see that the poverty manipulation was successful, as revealed in the strength of the poverty condition variable on need sensitivity. The merit condition is
also moderately important, with participants on average
less sensitive to poverty as the degree to which income
is merited increases. For women (column 2), the poverty condition is a strong predictor of need sensitivity, as
in the previous experiments. Also important is the merit condition, with women’s concern for need weakening
when income is thought to be increasingly merited. For
men (column 3) the poverty condition is also a significant predictor of need sensitivity, unlike in the previous
experiments. So, too, is ideology, with liberal men more
concerned with need than conservative ones. These results, combined with those from Experiment 2, provide
us with considerable evidence that need is a distinct allocation principle.
DISCUSSION
We wish to summarize our findings and discuss how our
results concerning gender in particular relate to research
on the gender gap in other areas of political inquiry. Be-
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fore discussing our results, however, we should address
the possible limits to their generalizability. Like most experimental research, we used a convenience sample of
undergraduates, raising legitimate questions about external validity (see Sears 1986). We did make our subject pool as diverse as possible, partly through using an
unusually large sample and partly through our choice of
test site. One of our test sites, the University of Houston,
is quite diverse (over 50 percent minority students). We
nonetheless cannot claim to have a representative sample. Most notably, our subject pool is heavily skewed in
terms of age. Based on national survey data, we know
that younger respondents are more oriented toward equality, and so it is quite plausible that a more representative
sample would show participants less oriented to equality
than our results suggest. Whatever the limits of external
validity, however, our first concern was internal validity.
Our primary aim was to examine the relationship among
allocation principles and to see how they changed when
we manipulated theoretically relevant conditions. By manipulating crucial variables between participants, we are
able to test these principles without alerting participants
to our interest in these questions. We included a rigorous
manipulation check to guarantee that only participants
who received the experimental treatment were included.
Likewise, by asking participants in the post-experimental
questionnaire about their own perceptions of the relationship between merit and income, and then entering that information as an independent variable in our analyses, we
are able to determine that our experimental manipulations
rather than participants’ pre-existing perceptions explain
our results. This test shows how using multiple regression
analysis to enter additional controls can strengthen experimental research. The success of these safeguards combined with the inherent strengths of experimental research
(see Kinder and Palfry 1993) make us confident that we
have strong internal validity and that further research to
confirm and extend our results would be fruitful.
Allocation Principles in Distributive
Justice Judgments
We found that all of the allocation principles we study—
equality, efficiency, merit, and need—play a distinct role
in distributive justice judgments. We also found that most
individuals use all or most of these principles simultaneously in making judgments rather than applying different norms in separate “spheres.” Finally, we observed
that individual characteristics influence how they weigh
these principles. Most strikingly, we found an unexpectedly strong sex difference in the use of these principles.
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Equality. Equality performed as a normal good with participants overwhelmingly preferring more equality over
less while holding efficiency constant. Furthermore, the
general trend of participants shows a strong desire for
equality even at the cost of a considerable loss in efficiency. This finding strongly reaffirms Mitchell et al.’s
(1993) results and suggests that equality plays a stronger
role than Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) found.
Efficiency. Efficiency also performed as a normal good,
more was consistently and overwhelmingly preferred to
less, when holding other factors constant. We found individuals use both equality and efficiency as allocation
principles and make tradeoffs between them. Our results accord with Okun’s (1975) influential framework
for public policy analysis. Our findings concerning the
factors influencing individuals’ equality and efficiency
preferences partially confirm previous research, but also
suggest a more complex picture than earlier studies, especially concerning sex.
Merit. Our aggregate-level results initially appeared
to suggest that all individuals are less concerned with
equality as the degree to which income is merited increases, confirming the results of Mitchell et al.’s (1993)
study. Upon closer inspection, however, we discovered the results were driven entirely by women. Men’s
equality-efficiency preferences were not influenced by
merit assumptions, but instead by ideology, which was
not a statistically significant predictor for women. Our
findings arguably support both sides of the debate over
whether merit is a valid moral allocation principle, but
that support is unexpectedly divided along gender lines
that philosophers—and many empirical researchers—do
not usually consider.
Need. One of our principal aims was to determine whether need is a distinct allocation principle. We found that
need is a distinct principle, but we also saw that sensitivity to need can be difficult to distinguish from a concern
about inequality. Need can be defined either absolutely,
as we did, or relatively. Defined relatively, sensitivity to
need is difficult to distinguish from concern for inequality or relative deprivation. Participants in our study consistently exhibited a low preference for low-equality distributions, and much of their need sensitivity seems to
have been obscured by their concern for inequality. Only
when we sufficiently distinguished need and inequality in our experimental design did we find a consistently distinct concern for need. We found that women are
more sensitive to need than men, consistent with earli-
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er research, but we also found that concern for need was
mediated by merit assumptions among women alone.
Also consistent with earlier research, we found some evidence that political ideology influences need sensitivity,
with conservatives on average less concerned with need
than liberals.
Finally, before turning to socio-psychological and
other explanations for the gender differences we have
found, we must consider the possibility that our results
are due in part to the specific tradeoffs used in our experimental design. While the influence of merit assumptions on equality-efficiency preferences was not statistically significant for men, the direction of the change
in those preferences was consistent with the statistically
significant change in women’s preferences. We may not
have been able to see the influence of merit on equality-efficiency preferences among men because of the
range of equality and efficiency levels we used in our
design. An altered design that increased the cost of trading off equality for efficiency might reveal the influence
of merit assumptions among men where their preference
for marginal increases in efficiency was weaker. That we
found such clear gender differences, and the fact that the
differences we found were not inconsistent with previous findings in justice research, nonetheless suggests we
must entertain other explanations.
The Gender Gap in Distributive
Justice Judgments
Certainly our most surprising and potentially most interesting results regard differences in how women and men
use allocation principles in distributive justice judgments. Based on earlier research, we expected to see differences between women and men concerning their relative preferences for equality and efficiency and their
sensitivity to need. We did see such results, but we also
discovered gender differences that went well beyond
these ,relative preferences. In particular, we found unexpected gender-specific interactions of merit with the
other allocation principles. We saw that women’s equality-preferences were mediated by merit assumptions,
but that men’s were not. These findings are in some tension with other research on gender differences regarding merit beliefs. For example, Major, Bylsma, and Cozzarelli (1989) find in work domains men tend to distribute rewards using merit while women emphasize equality (see also Major and Adams 1983). While suggestive,
our studies differ sufficiently to make it difficult to draw
any strong conclusions regarding the compatibility of
results. Likewise, we found that women’s sensitivity to
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need was mediated by merit assumptions whereas men’s
were unaffected. Our research was not designed to explore these effects since we did not anticipate these gender-specific interactions. Nor does previous justice research offer guidance in interpreting the results. We can
nonetheless consider several explanations that have been
offered for gender gaps observed in political and policy
preferences.
Two leading theories have been advanced for gender differences found in political, social, and moral behavior and attitudes. The first is gender socialization, the
best known version of which is Gilligan’s (1982) “different voice” theory. She argues that women emphasize
an ethic of “care and connection” while men tend to embrace an “ethic of rights” that stresses individualism. On
the one hand, our finding that women are more sensitive
to need than men generally accords with her position.
On the other hand, our results concerning merit seem to
run contrary to her theory since, based on what she does
argue, one would probably expect men and not women
to distribute according to merit. The fact that women’s
equality-efficiency preferences were mediated by merit
assumptions, however, suggests a sensitivity to context
in moral reasoning that Gilligan argues is more typical
of women.
The other leading explanation for gender differences emphasizes structural or situational differences between women and men in society. This explanation points to women’s traditional socioeconomic position and suggests their tendency to weigh social welfare
issues more heavily than men is the result of their vulnerability relative to men (e.g., Piven 1985). In terms of
our experiment, women’s socioeconomic position might
explain why they weigh need and equality more heavily than men. While this theory may explain the intercept effects we find, it does not explain the interaction
effects we find between gender and the use of these principles in relation to merit assumptions. Gender socialization and socioeconomic theories require further testing before the underlying reason for such gender differences is clear.
Recent research into the gender gap observed in political and policy preferences over the past two decades
provides somewhat more guidance in interpreting our
own findings. There are two basic approaches to explaining the gender gap in voting and party preferences. The first approach focuses on attitude differences, arguing that the gender gap stems from underlying differences in political attitudes that are politicized in similar ways. The second approach emphasizes possible differences in how women and men weigh certain issues,
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suggesting that the gender gap is explained better by different levels of salience of political issues for women
and men. Both approaches have received some empirical support (see Kaufman and Petrocik 1999), but the
second approach is more relevant to our research since
we also find basic differences in how women and men
weigh allocation principles. Early studies of the different
weights that women and men assign to political issues
found that men tend to weigh military issues more heavily and that women tend to give greater weight to social
issues (Gilens 1988; see Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).
Our results are generally in line with these findings, insofar as we observe women being more sensitive to need
and equality, which are principles analogous to the social issues examined in the gender gap research. Perhaps
more suggestive, research into gender differences in economic policy preferences has suggested that women tend
to vote more sociotropically and men more egoistically
(Welch and Hibbing 1992; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler
1998). This finding may be analogous to the difference
we find between women and men concerning the interaction between merit and equality-efficiency preferences. Interpreted in this light, women in our study were behaving more sociotropically, reacting to the information
about the degree to which merit is said to predict income
in society as a whole, and men were behaving more egoistically, with their equality-efficiency preferences determined by their individual ideological beliefs. This parallel is weakened by the fact that our study examined impartial, and not self-interested, judgments and preferences. The difference in how women and men reason about
distributive justice that we found nonetheless parallelsand may even underlie-the gender gap seen in political
and policy preferences.
CONCLUSION
We have found that distributive justice norms are complex yet structured. The fact that individuals use several distinct allocation principles simultaneously in distributive decisions makes their behavior necessarily
complex. This complexity is nonetheless comprehensible, both because the underlying theoretical relationship among these allocation principles is structured and
because the independent factors that influence how individuals use these principles are predictable. The gender difference we find in how individuals use and weigh
allocation principles in particular raises new questions
for justice research to explore. The theoretical relationships we find among allocation principles should be of
interest to political and moral theorists, and our empir-
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ical findings should be considered when thinking about
the philosophical validity of justice theories as well as
their practical application. Our findings also provide a
grounding for more theoretically informed empirical investigations of political attitudes and behavior. If we
are interested in individuals’ opinions on the distribution of society’s benefits and burdens, we need appropriate stimuli for eliciting meaningful responses and understanding their views in their full complexity. In making
political, social, and moral decisions women and men
are concerned in part with justice, and our research is a
step toward understanding distributive justice norms in
theory and practice.
Appendix
Participant Instructions
Portions printed in italics are varied between-subject. The first
selection specifies the degree to which income is explained
by effort and ability (10 percent, 5’0 percent, 90 percent),
while the other selections specify the level of the poverty line
($10,000 and $15,000).
Assessment of Income Distributions
Please read the description below. Please ask if you have any
questions at any time.
Imagine that you are an outside advisor to the country described below. You are not a member of the country. You are
being asked to give your opinion on what policies would be
best for the country. We are interested in your ideas about how
income should be distributed when your own interests are not
at stake.
Country D is a self-governed society made up of people
of a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. There is a broad
variety of occupations in the society. Scientific studies have
demonstrated that the amount of income a person receives in
Country D is due almost entirely to the person’s effort and
ability. People who are willing to work hard, take some risks,
and acquire the proper education and skills have a very good
chance of having a higher income. On the other hand, people who are not willing to do these things have a very good
chance of having a lower income. The amount of income a
person receives is 90% due to his or her effort and ability, and
only 10% due to luck, connections, and similar factors.
The people of Country D are considering a number of
policies for their society. Economic studies have demonstrated
what effects the different policies will have on the average income in the country as a whole and on differences in people’s
income (income distribution). Backers of the different policies
are convinced by these studies and do not disagree about the
effects of the policies. They do disagree on which policy is
the best for their country. Among other considerations, certain
analysts are more concerned about the average income, while
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others are more concerned about equality of income.
You are being asked to give your opinion about how
good the different policies would be for Country D based on
their effects on income.
In order to evaluate these different policies, you will be
presented with charts that show their effects on income. The
charts show family incomes broken down into each quintile
(20 percent) of families, from the poorest 20 percent of families up to the wealthiest 20 percent. The charts also give you
information about:
• the average income in the country as a whole;
• the poverty line (the amount of income needed to provide for the basic needs of food, housing, clothing, and
medical care for a four-person family). The poverty
line in Country D is $15,000.
• the income inequality ratio, a commonly used measure
of income inequality. The ratio tells you how many
times greater the income of the wealthiest 20 percent
of families is compared to the poorest 20 percent of
families. For example, if the wealthiest 20 percent earn
$100,000 and the poorest 20 percent earn $20,000,
then the wealthiest 20 percent earn 5.0 times more income than the poorest 20 percent, making the income
inequality ratio 5.0. The .higher the income inequality
ratio, the more unequal incomes are; the lower the income inequality ratio, the more equal incomes are.
All the income figures are for after tax income for fourperson families. All income figures are in U.S. dollar equivalents.
The chart below shows what effects a hypothetical plan,
Plan Z, would have on income for Country D. Average family
incomes after taxes are: $18,000 per year for the poorest .20
percent of families, $26,000 for the next 20 percent, $34,000
for the next 20 percent, $50,000 for the next 20 percent, and
$72,000 for the wealthiest 20 percent. The average family income for the country as a whole is $40,000. The poverty line
is $15,000. The income inequality ratio is 4.0.
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